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 Based on previous theories that strong militaries’ coercive capacities can be used for 
political repression, I focus on the relationship between military spending and democratic failure. 
I predict that greater military funding will be associated with a higher rate of democratic 
backsliding. To test this hypothesis, I use data from Freedom House on democratic quality to 
identify cases of democratic decline. These instances are compared to levels of military spending 
and controls such as economic inequality, level of institutionalization, and natural resource rents 
that may affect the probability of democratic failure. While no relationship is established with 
military spending, this research strengthens support for past arguments on how economic growth 

















 This research explores the effect of greater military strength on democratic backsliding. 
Research into this connection could inform policymakers about negative side effects of highly 
prioritizing the military relative to other institutions. Sudden prioritization of the military could 
be a warning sign for future political repression. In turn, entire democracies could be threatened 
by the actions of strong militaries. 
 Currently, prominent examples of militaries being used to suppress democratic 
movements have come to light. For example, in November and December of 2019, journalists 
have documented the killing of over 1,000 protestors in Iran by the country’s military (Morello 
and Ryan 2019). In cases, like in Iran, where protest is directly levied at the government, well-
funded militaries are able to use their military power to impose “order” on democratic 
movements and enforce the political will of states. Even in democracies, strong militaries can be 
used to suppress democratic movements and threaten established political norms. Also in 
December of 2019, the Indian military has been used to suppress protests surrounding an 
immigration bill. These forces have been filmed using tear gas and canings to disperse peaceful 
demonstrations (Kalita 2019). Even within such an entrenched democracy, the military is able to 
use its resources to repress political movements and threaten political freedom.  
 In light of the common use of military action for political repression, the threat of a 
powerful military is apparent. If a linkage between military strength and democratic failure were 
discovered by research, policymakers would be better informed about the consequences of 





Understanding Democratic Quality 
Classically, various factors have been seen as contributing to the “building blocks of 
democracy” necessary for the formation and stabilization of democratic systems. These factors 
have included a strong civil society promoting democracy and democratic transitions (Way 2014, 
36), supportive economic conditions (Geddes 1999), and strong institutions able to resist 
challenges to democracy (Waldner and Lust 2018). In the absence of these factors, democracies 
can begin to degrade in quality and backslide. 
Political culture has been investigated as a factor contributing to democratic decline. 
Walden and Lust note that culture can directly and indirectly shape political behavior and 
decision-making (2018, 98). While culture tends to remain stable over time within a country, an 
internal clash of differing political cultures could lead to democratic backsliding (Waldner and 
Lust 2018). Other scholars point to shifting values as factors promoting or hindering democracies 
(Ingleheart and Welzel 2005). Values that promote democracy include values such as individual 
liberty, diversity, and individual autonomy, while the values that hinder democracy include 
support for collective discipline, group conformity, and state authority (Ingleheart and Welzel 
2005, 2-3). According to Ingleheart and Welzel, as self-expression values become more 
prominent in society, the level of tolerance and equality for minority groups increases and 
overall political activism increases (2005). As a whole, this shift of values results in a more 
accepting and open society that lends itself well to democratic systems where civil rights and 
liberties are protected.   
Still yet, other scholars believe that the level of social capital and its distribution reinforce 
or hinder democracy (Putnam 1993). Depending on the level of social capital favoring the 
formation of democracy (Waldner and Lust 2018, 99) in the hands of citizens and the level of 
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elite resistance, it would be possible for citizens to affect democratic transitions and for elites to 
affect democratic backsliding. In this framework, “elites engineer the undermining of democracy 
by subterfuge” (Waldner and Lust 2018, 99) while the lower and middle classes become 
politically engaged to make society more democratic.  
Economic factors can also lead to declines in democratic quality. Poverty and low 
economic growth, for example, have been associated with democratic breakdown due to the 
same dissatisfaction that can spark democratic transition (Londregan and Poole 1990). Scholars 
have also found that “…coups d’état (one facet of instability) are negatively related to both the 
level of income… and the rate of economic growth…” (Londregan and Poole 1990, 178). If 
regimes are unable to ensure a sufficient level of wealth and economic growth, the safety and 
stability of these ruling groups is threatened. If citizens are able to amass more wealth by some 
means, these economic resources can be used to directly challenge the power of the failing state.  
In addition, economic inequality (in terms of income and wealth) can increase the 
likelihood of popular revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Furthermore, inequality in the 
distribution of natural resource endowments can also threaten democracy through “secessionist 
movements pursuing a radical approach to decreasing (or increasing) horizontal inequality” 
(Ross et al. 2012, 251). This uneven distribution of wealth and resources can, according to this 
view, have a negative impact on democratic quality regardless of the existing level of wealth 
present within a society. Scholars have also pointed to the fact that “democracies will rationally 
tax land and the income from land at higher rates than capital”, which leads elites to negatively 
affect democratic quality in the pursuit of maintaining economic inequality (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006, 319). In this framework, elites resist and hinder democratization to protect their 
privileged political and economic status within society. At the same time, lower and middle-class 
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citizens are motivated to reduce economic inequality by redistributing national income after 
rebellion (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 36).  
In addition, the presence and distribution of natural resource endowments can negatively 
impact democracies. Ross cites oil as an impetus to democracy, explaining that oil sets back 
democracy, especially within poor countries (2001, 356). Ross also highlights that this hindrance 
to democracy has an even greater effect in less-developed economies (2001, 356). Once again, 
unequal distributions of natural resources can also enable secessionist groups based on economic 
inequality (Ross et al. 2012).  
Oil threatens democracy by breaking the social contract of states. Since oil and gas 
creates such high levels of revenue and defeats the need for taxation, “… they fail to develop the 
organic expectations of accountability that emerge when states make citizens pay taxes” 
(Diamond 2010, 98). Based on this economic structure, states with oil-based economies tend to 
use high levels of spending and low taxation to expand security forces. These states act to 
decrease the probability of democratic transition and maintain control of these valuable natural 
resources (Ross 2001, 356-357). In particular, this buildup of security and intelligence forces 
results in a powerful and engaged military (Diamond 2010, 98) that is able to suppress civil 
society and democratization.  
Finally, scholars have examined how institutional strength and design can hinder 
democracy. As Haggard and Kaufman explain, weak institutions can create a security dilemma 
that erodes constitutional strength (2016, 133). A lack of political institutionalization results in 
an unstable system that is unable to withstand democratic challenges such as constitutional 
crises. This instability erodes democracy and constitutional strength, paving the way for 
executive overreach and democratic failure. When political norms begin to break down, a 
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democracy’s “set of shared beliefs and practices that helped make… institutions work” are 
eroded, further leading to a decrease in democratic quality (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 117).   
Agent-based theories put forward have proposed that highly presidential systems with 
weak institutions can lead to democratic breakdown due to various implications of this 
institutional design. Linz (1990) highlights the dual legitimacy of the president and legislature 
inherent in executive systems and the problems posed by zero-sum presidential elections. Unlike 
the coalitions of a parliamentary system, presidents have fixed terms and are not forced to form 
coalitions to win elections. This “zero-sum game… raises the stakes of presidential elections and 
inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization” (Linz 1990, 56). As polarization 
becomes exacerbated within a political system, conflict can become more bitter and executives 
can cling to power and threaten democratic stability (Linz 1990).  
If presidential executives in these systems are not subject to accountability under a 
constitution (Van de Walle, 2003, 310), democracy is able to be broken down by individual 
authoritarian executives (Fish 2001). Unsurprisingly, since presidential systems tend to have 
stronger executives, scholars have found that presidentialism has a negative effect on 
democracy’s stabilization (Svolik, 2008, 155) and that parliamentary democracies have higher 
levels of stability due to the above flaws associated with presidential system design (Przeworski 
et al., 2000, 136).  
Military Strength and its Impact on Democratic Quality  
Intuitively, it is clear that stronger militaries may shape a country’s political system since 
coups are often precipitated by state military actors and can topple democracy. The potential for 
military overthrow of democratically-elected governments is especially apparent by examining 
the history of Latin America. In this region alone, 162 coups occurred between 1900 and 2006 
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(Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 1109). Prominent examples, such as the 1932 and 1973 Chilean 
coups, employed military resources to overthrow democratically elected governments (Lehoucq 
and Pérez-Liñán 2013). The prevalent usage of military resources to interfere in democratic 
processes clearly demonstrate the potential danger of strong militaries. 
The strength of a military is also tied to the coercive capacity of a state. As Cole notes, 
“…coercive capacity overpowers the pacifying effects of executive constraints… a large military 
generally increases the likelihood of internal repression” (2018, 159). As the use of coercion 
increases throughout a state, democratic norms are undermined and freedoms tend to be 
repressed. A larger military allows for an increase in the military’s relative strength and, by 
extension, the state’s coercive capacity. This expansion of coercive capacity is directly tied to 
increases in funding because the military can upsize their personnel, expand surveillance, and 
develop complicated weaponry (Cole 2018, 150). As the military expands in power and its 
capabilities increase, strong executives have the capability to repress the population with 
surveillance, weapons, and policing that can crush dissent. The use of internal repression 
facilitated by this increased coercive capacity therefore poses a significant threat to peace, 
stability, and democratic quality.  
It stands to reason, therefore, that stronger militaries should result in a decline in 
democratic quality. As Clardie (2010) asserts, “…as military expenditures become a greater 
share of central government expenditures, the likelihood of democratic transition failure 
increases” in the form of transitions away from democratic forms of government (171). Clardie 
links military spending to greater coup risk because increasing a military’s resources directly 
enables it to interfere in domestic affairs in terms of the repression described above (2010, 166). 
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) debunk the idea that “Large defense budgets prevent coups both by 
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keeping the army happy and by empowering parallel security institutions to perform their coup-
proofing functions” (Makara 2013, 166). In fact, they conclude that there is a lack of evidence 
that supports this idea throughout most of the world (2007, 20). 
Even without clear transition failure, Feaver emphasizes, conflict and tension will still 
occur, which can undermine democratic quality (1999, 220). Since military spending does not 
deter coups (Collier and Hoeffler 2007) and governments have an incentive to outcompete 
neighboring militaries (Collier and Hoeffler 2002), countries will tend to overspend in the 
context of defense and further augment the potential for dangerous coercion by the state. Since 
increases in spending fail to neutralize threats to democratic stability and increase the potential 
for state coercion of citizens, democracy is directly threatened. As states increasingly have the 
ability to repress minority groups and undermine democratic processes, it is intuitive that 
regimes will be incentivized to use this newfound capacity for personal and political gain. 
As I expect that high levels of military spending may decrease the likelihood of 
successful maintenance of democracy, increase the capacity for coercion by the state, and be 
promoted by powerful incentives facing regimes, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis: Greater military spending in a country is associated with a higher risk of 
democratic failure. 
 
Data and Methods 
 To test my hypothesis, I run a country-level analysis of all countries included in Freedom 
House’s dataset. I limit this analysis only to countries that have been classified as free or partly 
free; non-democracies are dropped because they cannot decline any further in Freedom House 
classification. The time frame studied is 1972-2017, which data from my main variables are 
widely available for. Based on these criteria, 8418 country-years of data and 2026 country-level 
instances of democratic decline are analyzed. 
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Dependent Variables  
 To measure democracy, I use Freedom House’s Country and Territory Ratings and 
Statuses, 1972-2016 (Freedom House 2017). Freedom House’s ratings capture political freedom 
in that they provide a clear indicator of the status of civil rights within the country, which tend to 
be targeted by repressive, nondemocratic regimes. Many different political freedoms are 
captured, including issues such as rule of law, the functioning of an independent judiciary, right 
to assembly, and freedom of speech. These measures help aggregate common political rights and 
freedoms in various countries, which can be used to gauge if countries are functioning as healthy 
democracies. Freedom House assigns each country with a designation of Not Free, Partially Free, 
or Free depending on the overall status of both Civil Liberties (CL) and Political Rights (PR) 
within the country (Freedom House 2017). In order to select cases demonstrating democratic 
backslide, the first dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating whether a country 
has declined in Freedom House status year-over-year. The variable is coded as 1 if a country 
moves from Free or Partially Free to a lower designation and 0 in all other cases. The second 
dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that only indicates if countries have declined from 
full, free democracies (coded as 2) to a lower status of Partially Free (1) or Not Free (0). Since 
my dependent variables are dichotomous, I employ a logistic regression. 
Independent Variable 
To measure country-level military spending, I use the World Bank’s Military Expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP (World Bank 2018). It codes military spending as a proportion of GDP, 
which eliminates discrepancies between spending levels and the size of government revenue in 
various countries. This measure provides a clear snapshot of how much a country is prioritizing 




To account for other explanations of democratic decline, I control for economic growth 
and inequality, the resource curse, strength of institutionalization, and varying systems of 
government. To control for economic growth’s impact on democratization, I use The World 
Bank Group’s GDP growth as an annual percentage (World Bank 2017). It coded as a 
percentage of GDP change from the previous year. In order to control for a country’s overall 
inequality, I use The World Bank Group’s GINI Index Estimate (World Bank 2017). This 
variable is coded as a percentage from a theoretic zero (complete economic equality) to one-
hundred (complete economic inequality).  
To control for resource curse explanations, I use The World Bank Group’s Total Natural 
Resource Rents as a percentage of GDP (World Bank 2017). The variable is coded as a 
percentage for each year within a country. This measure captures the portion of a country’s 
economy that is dependent on the sale of natural resources, which directly correlates with the 
economic dependence a country places on its resources (such as oil).  
To control for the role of weak institutionalization in the breakdown of democratic 
legitimacy, I use The World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 
2017). These variables are coded as values from -2.5 (weakest governance) to 2.5 (strongest 
governance). Six categories are captured by the indicators—Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption. I take the average of these variables for each country and year to account for 
discrepancies between each measure as they all capture the level of institutionalization within the 
country and the degree to which government effectively operates. 
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Finally, to address the argument that presidentialism has a negative impact on democracy, 
I utilize the Inter-American Development Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 2015 (Inter-
American Development Bank 2017). The variables are coded under “System” with a “0” for 
presidential, a “1” for an assembly-elected president, and a “2” for parliamentary government. I 
run two separate analyses for this variable—one includes all systems of government and another 
omits “1” altogether to ensure that semi-presidential systems of government do not disrupt the 
control variable. This measure captures the political systems used within each particular country 
and also accounts for semi-presidential systems that could have an impact on democracy.  
Results 
 Table 1 presents the results of my logistic regression. The significant coefficients should 
be interpreted so that positive coefficients are associated with increases in variable measures and 
negative coefficients with decreases in variable measures in the presence of democratic decline. 
Models 1 and 3 utilize my first dependent variable, which includes all cases of democratic 
decline. Models 2 and 4 utilize my second dependent variable, which only includes cases of 
democratic backsliding in “Free” countries to a lower Freedom House status. Models 3 and 4 lag 
the dependent variables by one year based on the idea that military strength ought to increase 









Table 1: Instances of democratic failure, logistic regression (1972-2017) 
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
Military Spending  -.023  .036  -.127  -.183 
    (.059)  (.084)  (.087)  (.169) 
 
 
GDP Growth   -.062*  -.071  -.025  .030 
    (.034)  (.064)  (.036)  (.073) 
 
 
Economic Inequality  .010  .040  .010  .037 
    (.020)  (.033)  (.020)  (.035) 
 
 
Natural Resource Rents .014  -.016  .010  -.036 
    (.015)  (.041)  (.015)  (.040) 
 
 
Good Governance  -1.018*** -5.009*** -1.168*** -6.422*** 
    (.334)  (1.377) (.351)  (1.621) 
 
 
Democratic Systems (1) .009  .264  .048  .336 
    (.241)  (.371)  (.239)  (.367) 
 
 
Democratic Systems (2) .083  .262  .048  .335 
    (.233)  (.366)  (.239)  (.364) 
 
 
Constant   -4.496*** -5.643*** -4.399*** -5.659*** 
    (.957)  (1.649) (.980)  (1.852) 
 
 
Observations   2026 (183) 928 (183) 2026 (183) 922 (183) 
Cox & Snell R Square .012  .057  .013  .065 
-2 Log Likelihood  361.605 115.282 358.919 107.808 
 
Note: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Military Spending, GDP Growth, Economic Inequality, 





 With regard to military spending, no significant relationship is found. However, declines 
in democratic quality do have a significant relationship with some of the control variables. 
Decreased levels of GDP growth do result in democratic decline in accordance with theories of 
political economy. In addition, declines in good governance (a sign of weak institutionalization) 
are strongly associated with democratic backslide. This finding supports the idea that governance 
tends to be weaker in non-democracies in light of overbearing executives, corruption, lack of 
accountability, and weak protection of civil rights and liberties. I do not find a significant 
relationship for any of the other controls supported by previous research.   
Conclusion: Data Issues and Possible Future Research 
 No significant relationship was established between military spending and democratic 
backslide, but this research faced considerable data issues. Data on military spending as a 
percentage of GDP is scarce for various countries and timeframes, which severely limited 
analysis. In addition, limited instances of democratic decline from “Free” democracies 
constricted the ability to investigate some instances of backslide. Moreover, removing country-
level outliers from consideration that are democracies, but have unusually high military spending 
(e.g. India and the United States) may allow for a more accurate analysis of this topic. Going 
forward, it may be possible to remedy these issues and more deeply analyze this issue.  
 Data problems could be partially remedied by operationalizing military strength 
differently. It is possible that measures like number of military personnel by country or military 
spending as a percentage of government revenue would provide less spotty data and better 
capture a regime’s prioritization of military strength. By using a measure like spending as a 
percentage of government revenue, it would be clear to compare the relative importance of 
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